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Abstract 
This study analyses the impact of primary converter academies on pupil progress, using data from the 
National Pupil Database. Adopting a difference-in-differences methodology, a positive influence of 
converter academies upon pupil outcomes is identified when comparing individuals exposed to 
academy conversion with those who complete primary school before conversion. Attending a 
converter academy increases a pupil’s ranking within their cohort, according to the average point 
score, by between 1.1 and 2.6 percentile points. Primary converter academies are found to 
consistently improve pupil outcomes within areas of low deprivation whereas in areas of high 
deprivation, the identified effect may be much greater but is more variable across years of conversion 
and cohorts. White pupils and pupils not in receipt of free school meals are also consistently found to 
benefit from converter academy attendance. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Introduced by the Labour government in the early 2000s, academy schools present a divergence from 
the usual provision of state schooling in England. Academies are publicly funded schools that gain 
greater autonomy by functioning independently of local authorities. Initially, the Academies 
Programme aimed to replace underperforming secondary schools situated in socially disadvantaged 
urban areas with a poor GCSE attainment performance record; these schools would be converted into 
sponsored academies, appointed a new governing body and managed by an academy trust. By 2010, 
203 secondary sponsored academies existed within England’s education system (Department for 
Education, 2011). Following the 2010 general election, the coalition government stated its intentions 
to widen the academies remit, offering primary, secondary and special schools the opportunity to seek 
academy status. The Academies Act 2010 consequently increased the heterogeneity of new academies 
by permitting all schools to apply to voluntarily convert to converter academies; this allowed for all 
schools to benefit from the greater autonomy of an academy without a sponsor1 (National Audit 
Office, 2010). Schools rated outstanding by Ofsted, who voluntarily applied to become an academy, 
were fast-tracked through the process of conversion, allowing for conversion within the same year. 
‘Weak’ schools continued to be advised that improvement could be attainable through conversion to 
a sponsored academy. 
 
Though the proportion of primary academies is relatively small at 13% relative to the 60% of 
secondary schools that academies constitute, the number of primary academies exceeds the number 
of secondary academies (House of commons, 2015), with over half a million pupils attending a 
primary academy (Department for Education, 2014b). Given the commitment to the expansion of the 
academy programme, the quantity of all academies is expected to continue to rise (Department for 
Education, 2016). 
It is imperative to understand the impact and usefulness of the large-scale academies programme for 
which resources and funding is required. It is equally vital to assess the programme as a determinant 
of primary pupils’ outcomes since educational attainment in the early stages of schooling are key 
determinants of educational outcomes later in life (Dearden et al.  2004). Since one in five children 
leave primary school unable to read at the level required for secondary school (Department for 
Education, 2015b), it is vital to understand which policies improve or worsen educational standards 
in practice. The impact of academy schools upon pupil performance will form the focus of this paper 
                                                          
1 Sponsored academies are usually previously underperforming schools that convert under a sponsor to become an 
academy in order to raise attainment. Converter academies are previously successful schools that voluntarily select to 
become an academy, often to benefit from greater autonomy.   
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which will examine the effect of primary converter academy schools specifically. Utilising pupil-
level data from the National Pupil Database (NPD) a difference-in-differences (DID) methodology is 
adopted to observe the impact upon pupil progress between Key Stage 1 (KS1), when pupils are aged 
7, and Key Stage 2 (KS2)2, when aged 11. 
Evidence of the impact of academy schools upon pupil outcomes is currently limited; this is especially 
so for post-2010 converter academies and equally, for primary academies, thus prompting the 
reported need for further research into academy schools (House of Commons, 2015). The existing 
literature has largely focused on analysing the impact of pre-2010, Labour secondary sponsored 
academies; promising results have been presented, with a positive relationship with pupil outcomes 
identified in a number of studies (Department for Education 2012; Hutchings et al. 2014; Eyles and 
Machin, 2015). In addition, evidence suggests that the quality of the pupil intake and Ofsted ratings 
improve post-conversion (Eyles and Machin, 2015). However, Wilson (2011) finds that sponsored 
academies reduce the intake of pupils from deprived backgrounds post-conversion, thus increasing 
educational inequality. The extent to which some pupils may be able to access the positive benefits 
of academy attendance may therefore be restricted.   
The relevance and generalisability of the sponsored academies literature may, however, be limited 
when evaluating primary converter academies because prior to 2010, only secondary schools 
converted to academies. Additionally, Eyles et al. (2015) identify that while Labour academies are 
characterised by low attainment and a high proportion of disadvantaged pupils from poor family 
backgrounds, post-2010 academies have a lower share of free school meals (FSM) eligible children 
and experience little change in the ability composition of their intake. Of greater significance to 
analyses of primary converter academies, is therefore the post-2010 academies literature which is 
currently very underdeveloped. One study of post-2010 converter academies by Worth (2014) 
examines the impact of secondary converter academies on school-level pupil performance measures3. 
Adopting a propensity score methodology, an insignificant difference in the performance of converter 
academies relative to characteristically similar maintained schools is generally identified, except in 
2014 when two-year-old academies were found to significantly outperform maintained schools in 
gold standard attainment and value-added measures, though differences are small. 
Central to the academies programme is school autonomy, which is often quoted as the main benefit 
of academy status (Cirin, 2014), providing schools with greater freedom in management that aids 
                                                          
2 Primary education may be split into two stages; infant, known as Key stage 1 (KS1), which caters for children between 
foundation year and 2 when pupils are aged between 5 and 7, and junior, referred to as Key stage 2 (KS2), which provides 
education to children in year 3 to year 6, up to the age of 11. 
3 Academies that converted between the 2009/10 and 2011/12 academic years are observed. 
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innovation and improvement. The higher management quality associated with more autonomous 
schools may positively influence pupil performance through practises such as accountability to an 
external governing body and the adoption of a long-term strategy (Bloom et al., 2015). The 
introduction of more autonomous schools into an education system is commonly associated with a 
modification to school choice, which, together with autonomy, is argued to assist in increasing 
educational standards. Greater choice may allow for the needs of pupils to be more closely matched 
to school provision (Machin and Silva, 2013), while improving standards through market 
mechanisms, as ‘good’ schools attract ‘good’ pupils and therefore financial benefits and incentives 
for schools. More autonomous school types, such as grant maintained (GM)4 and faith schools, often 
form the focus of the autonomy and choice literature in the UK. Clark (2009) identifies positive and 
significant gains to pupil performance of GM school attendance, when comparing GM schools to 
schools that narrowly missed out on GM conversion. Allen (2010) correspondingly identifies short-
term benefits of GM attendance; however, both authors acknowledge that improved pupil intake and 
a reduction in socially disadvantaged pupils following conversion may drive these results. More able 
pupils may therefore be attracted to more autonomous schools; Eyles and Machin (2015) find 
evidence for this when analysing secondary academy schools, whilst Gibbons and Silva (2011) 
similarly identify that more able pupils are more likely to attend more autonomous faith primary 
schools. Such schools are found to offer no advantages, in terms of pupil performance, relative to less 
autonomous LEA controlled primary schools. Choice and competition in primary education is 
however, found to provide positive performance gains for primary schools with autonomous 
governance (Gibbons et al. 2008).  Evidence from outside of the UK, from the US and Sweden, where 
charter schools and free schools benefit from greater levels of autonomy, suggests that greater school 
autonomy and choice is beneficial for pupil performance (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011; Hoxby and 
Muraka, 2009; Angrist et al. 2010; Böhlmark and Lindahl, 2012). 
 
This paper contributes to the academies literature in two ways; firstly, by investigating the impact of 
primary academy schools upon pupil progress and secondly, by analysing primary academies that 
converted between 2011/12 and 2013/14, thereby analysing post-2010 academies that voluntarily 
converted. By adopting a DID methodology, a treatment and control group are formed; pupils who 
were enrolled in a primary school prior to, and at the time of conversion, form the treatment group 
while the control group consists of pupils who attended eventual academies, but left before the 
primary school converted. The approach addresses the potential issue that a post-conversion 
improvement in pupil intake quality may drive positive performance findings (Eyles and Machin, 
                                                          
4 Grant maintained were state secondary schools that existed in England and Wales between 1988 and 1998. They were 
a product of the Education Reform Act 1988 that allowed existing schools to opt out of local government control.  
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2015; Wilson, 2011) by only observing individuals who were enrolled in a primary school prior to its 
conversion; the enrolment decision is therefore exogenous to the academy conversion. The approach 
also constructs a credible control group by only observing the pupils who attended eventual 
academies since the characteristics of academies and eventual academies are more comparable than 
non-converters in the sample period. Finally, treated individuals are compared with control 
individuals from the same school cohort; the treatment group are therefore subject to the same shocks 
and cohort-specific trends as individuals within the control group. The analysis is extended to identify 
whether the characteristics of pupils may determine the extent to which they are influenced by the 
academies programme. Additionally, the effect is estimated for pupils attending schools in deprived 
neighbourhoods and compared with non-deprived neighbourhoods. In a similar manner, the extent of 
a differential impact of primary converter academies by FSM status and ethnicity is explored. 
The results provide evidence of a positive influence of converter academies upon the outcomes of 
primary aged pupils; converter academies are found to increase the percentile rank of pupils’ average 
point scores by between 1.1 and 2.6 percentile points, ceteris paribus. These results are based on a 
number of models that are adopted within the analysis which allow for differences in the exposure of 
pupils to converter academies to be considered. The results are consistent across specifications and 
are robust to a falsified treatment placebo test.  
When estimating the effect of primary converter academies by school neighbourhood deprivation, 
pupil progress is more consistently found to be improved for pupils in the least deprived areas, relative 
to the most deprived areas, when multiple models varying in the year of academy conversion and 
pupil cohort are estimated. However, the magnitude of the effect is much smaller than in the most 
deprived neighbourhoods when a significant impact is identified for both subsamples. Similarly, pupil 
progress is more consistently significantly influenced by academies for white and non-FSM pupils, 
than their non-white and FSM counterparts.  
This paper will be structured as follows; section 2 will provide a description of the data with the 
methodology provided in section 3. The main results will be presented in section 4. A summary of 
the paper’s aims, findings and conclusions will be provided in section 5. 
2 Data 
 
The National Pupil Database (NPD) is utilised to analyse the impact of converter academies on pupil 
performance. The NPD is a pupil-level database containing data on all pupils in state schools in 
England which matches pupil-level data to school characteristics. Pupil characteristics are provided 
by the dataset alongside attainment data for each pupil from Key Stage 1 to Key Stage 5, allowing 
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for pupils to be tracked over time, across schools and educational institutions. NPD data from 2007-
2014 will be utilised to observe three cohorts of pupils; those leaving primary school in the academic 
year 2011/12 and 2012/13 alongside those leaving in 2013/14, as indicated in Table 1. The panel 
nature of the NPD data is utilised to allow for individuals to be observed at the end of both KS1 and 
KS25.  
Institutional data, provided by the Department for Education, is available for all schools for the 
2005/6-2014/15 academic years. School-level data are matched to each pupil in every year, so that 
changes in the school, for instance the institution type, may be tracked over time and observed once 
the pupil leaves school, or between observation periods (KS1 and KS2). This allows for pupils of 
eventual academies to be identified which is central to the control group construction.   
Individuals who experience a change in the unique identifier are dropped from the sample6. The 
unique identifier could change in three situations, each of which may impact directly upon pupil 
performance. Firstly, when a school’s local authority experiences a reorganisation; this may have 
implications for the competition and pupil intake of the pupil’s school. Secondly, following the 
movement of a pupil between schools. Thirdly, if a pupil moves from an infant to junior school; these 
individuals are likely to account for a large proportion of the dropped sample which are dropped since 
infant and junior schools are essentially two separate schools. Since in each situation pupil 
performance may be impacted, it is difficult to disentangle the performance effect of academy 
schools. Individuals with missing KS1 data are also dropped alongside individuals who start KS1 or 
KS2 at an unexpected age. A number of institutions’ observation years are also dropped since 
institutions are reported to be both academies and a different institution type within the same 
academic year; it is therefore difficult to establish the institution type.  
Table 2 indicates the year of academy conversion experienced by individuals within the sample, 
which consists of individuals from the three cohorts who attend academies or eventual academies and 
leave primary school between the 11/12 and 13/14 academic years.  
Table 1 Observed academic years 
COHORT FINAL KS1 ACADEMIC 
YEAR 
FINAL KS2 ACADEMIC 
YEAR 
1 2007/2008 2011/2012 
2 2008/2009 2012/2013 
3 2009/2010 2013/2014 
                                                          
5 When pupils are aged 6/7 and 10/11, dependent on the month of birth 
6 This leads to a loss of just over 1,100,000 observations  
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Table 2 Academic year of academy conversion 
YEAR ACADEMY OBSERVATIONS PERCENT 
2011 13,142 5.32 
2012 54,254 21.96 
2013 70,262 28.45 
2014 60,028 24.30 
2015 49,324 19.97 
Total 247,0107 100 
 
Institutional data is also matched to the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) and the Income 
Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI) 8 using the Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA)9 
of the school, allowing for the neighbourhood deprivation level of the institution to be identified. 
The outcome of interest is the percentile rank of the pupil’s average point score (APS). The APS is 
measured at the end of KS1 and KS210 and is used to calculate the pupil’s rank amongst all other 
pupils in the same cohort11.  The APS is often used to estimate the value-added score between KS1 
and KS2 which is a widely-adopted measure of progression between different levels of education 
(Gibbons et al. 2013; Wilson and Piebalga, 2008). The percentile rank of the child in terms of APS is 
used rather than the raw APS since APS scores may not take account of the differences in test 
difficulty between the different cohorts12.  
Figure 1 provides a density plot of the APS percentile ranks of the treated and control groups in KS1; 
overall, the pre-treatment percentile rank distribution is similar for treated and control individuals. 
The mean percentile rank of the control group is 48.39 which is comparable to the treatment group 
mean of 48.97. Differences in the distribution of the APS rank between the treatment and control 
group are apparent in the post-treatment period, as Figure 2 shows, particularly below the 20th 
percentile and beyond the 60th percentile. Relative to the pre-treatment period, greater differences in 
                                                          
7 This equates to 123,505 individuals whose schools become converter academies since individuals are observed in two 
periods; KS1 and KS2 
8 The IMD and IDACI each provide a measure of relative deprivation for every neighbourhood in England. The IDACI 
measures the proportion of children specifically, that reside in low income households The IMD and IDACI deciles relates 
to the neighbourhood of the school. 
9 LSOAs are geographic areas containing on average 1,500 residents or 650 households. Within England 32,844 LSOAs 
exist 
10 In KS1, the APS is calculated as the average score achieved in reading, writing and mathematics obtained from a teacher 
assessment. In KS2 the APS is based upon the average point score achieved in English, maths and science in the KS2 
standardised national tests (SATs) taken at age 11 by all primary school pupils. Though these measures vary slightly in 
the subject assessed since tests need to be age specific, the scores between KS1 and KS2 are comparable since they 
provide an indication of the child’s overall level of ability; it is likely that there will be a high correlation between the 
scores achieved in individual subjects. 
11 The percentile rank is based on all pupils within the cohort excluding those who are dropped from the sample due to 
missing data and other reasons to be specified later in this data section.  
12 Machin and McNally (2008) similarly adopt a percentile outcome measure when analysing the percentile reading score 
of pupils in the analysis of the literacy hour. 
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the mean percentile rank of the treated and control groups exist, at 52.47 and 51.06 respectively. The 
raw statistics therefore indicate that the change in the mean percentile score between KS1 and KS2 
is greater for the treated group, with a change of 3.5, than for the control group, with a change in 
mean percentile score of 2.7.  
Figure 1 KS1 APS percentile distribution treatment and control groups 
  
 
Figure 2 KS2 APS percentile distribution treatment and control groups 
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3 Methodology  
3.1 Difference-in-differences 
 
The difference-in-differences approach allows for the estimation of a treatment effect, specifically, 
the average treatment effect for the treated when we assume common trends; in the absence of 
treatment, treated individuals are assumed to be subject to the same trends as untreated individuals 
who therefore provide the counterfactual outcomes of the treated, should they have not received 
treatment, thereby overcoming the evaluation problem which occurs as only one outcome per person 
can be observed at any point in time.  
 
There are three key features of the methodology to highlight; firstly, treated individuals who 
experience academy conversion are compared with individuals whose schools become academies but 
once they had left the primary school, these are referred to as eventual academies. As the descriptive 
statistics to be presented indicate, eventual academies are characteristically more similar to converter 
academies than schools that do not convert; this is especially so since academy conversion is not 
random and is a choice made by the school. This is a similar approach to that taken by Eyles and 
Machin (2015) who employ a control group consisting of pupils in state schools that convert to 
academies after the study’s sample period ends. However, unlike Eyles and Machin (2015) this paper 
specifies and observes a specific year of conversion in each model for both the treatment and control 
group; this approach checks the robustness of results alongside the generalisability of the estimated 
effect of academy schools by year of conversion.  
Secondly, also in a similar manner to Eyles and Machin (2015), this study observes only individuals 
who already attend the primary school before academy conversion so that academy conversion should 
be exogenous to the school enrolment choice. This approach overcomes the potential issues 
surrounding the improved pupil intake of academies post-conversion (Eyles and Machin, 2015; 
Wilson, 2011). 
Thirdly, treated and control individuals are compared within the same cohort; individuals are 
therefore subject to the same cohort specific effects and time effects. This also allows for pupils to be 
compared within the same percentile rank since the rank relates to the APS scores of pupils in a 
specific cohort. Whilst this allows for different levels of exposure to academy schools to be examined, 
this approach also assists in analysing the generalisability of the identified impact of converted 
academies by cohort as well as by conversion year.  
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The outcome of interest, the pupil’s percentile rank, is measured at two points in time: in KS1 (age 
7) before treatment and in KS2 (age 11), in the post-treatment period. Treatment will occur between 
KS1, when the pupil attends the converting school and KS2, prior to the completion of primary 
school. The control group consists of individuals from the same cohort as the treated group, whose 
school converted to an academy after KS2, when they left primary school. Unlike the usual 
difference-in-differences set up, there is therefore not a single point in time which marks the treatment 
or the introduction of a policy for all treated individuals since schools converted at different times.  
Initially, the impact of academies that converted in 2011/2012 is analysed when compared to eventual 
academies that convert in the 2012/13 academic year and observing pupils who left primary school 
in the same academic year; this is referred to as model A. As a check of robustness and to analyse the 
generalisability of the results to all years and cohorts, these results are then compared with similar 
models that vary in the years of conversion or the cohort of pupils.  Three cohorts that completed KS2 
between 2011-12 and 2013/14 are observed in the analysis, as depicted in Figure 3. Table 3 
summarises the models to be estimated. The initial four models analyse the impact of converters 
within the 2011/12 academic year13. Individuals in the treatment and control group are from the same 
cohort and therefore leave primary school in the same year, which will be prior to the academy 
conversion year for the control group. While multiple years of conversion are observed, different 
levels of exposure are also examined; while in models A and B for example, treated individuals will 
experience an academy for up to one full academic year, in model C, exposure is up to two academic 
years. Pooled models are also examined; while the 12AB model simply pools the control groups from 
models A and B, the final pooled model includes all treated and control individuals from across the 
three cohorts and controls for year and cohort specific effects by including cohort dummies in the 
model. The sample size of each model is provided in Table 4. 
[Table 4 here] 
                                                          
13 The academic year continues to be recognised as September to August. For academy converters however, June to May 
is considered the same academic year since converters in June, July and August may not be open as academies for an 
entire month to students until September. E.g. an academy converting in  July 2011 would be considered as converting in 
the 11/12 year rather than the 10/11 academic year.  
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Table 3 Models to be analysed 
MODEL BECAME ACADEMY YEAR LEFT 
PRIMARY 
 TREATMENT CONTROL  
A 11/12 12/13 11/12 
B 11/12 13/14 11/12 
12 AB (A&B pooled) 11/12 12/13 or 13/14 11/12 
C 11/12 13/14 12/13 
D 12/13 13/14 12/13 
POOLED Any time while 
at school (11/12-
13/14) 
After child left 
school (11/12-
13/14 
11/12 - 13/14 
 
The first five models may therefore be represented in a general form as follows for pupil i in school 
s in year t: 
(Eq.1) 
𝑃𝐴𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠) ∗ (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠) + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 
This varies from the single pooled model which may be represented as follows: 
(Eq.2)  
𝑃𝐴𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠) ∗ (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠) + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 
PAPS gives the percentile rank of pupil 𝑖 at time 𝑡 in school 𝑠 within their cohort according to their 
APS. 𝛽0indicates the intercept term; 𝛽1 represents the coefficient on the interaction between the 
Figure 3 Cohorts observed 
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treatment dummy and the time dummy and therefore indicates the treatment effect. 𝛽2 denotes the 
coefficient on the treatment dummy and indicates, in the absence of treatment, the difference in the 
percentile rank of individuals in the treatment and control group. The parameter 𝛽3 is the coefficient 
on the time dummy equalling zero when the child is in KS1 and equalling one when the child in in 
KS2. The time dummy indicates how the percentile rank of pupils’ changes over time, from KS1 to 
KS2. The parameter 𝛽4 is a vector of coefficients on the characteristics of individual 𝑖 at time 𝑡 in 
school s affecting their distribution in the test score ranks. 𝑆𝑠𝑡 is a vector of school characteristics that 
may influence pupils’ rank in the APS distribution of their cohort. 𝑇𝑡, which appears in equation 3 
only represents the cohort dummies which enter the model to control for cohort and year specific time 
effects in the pooled model. Finally,  𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 denotes the error term. It should be noted that standard 
errors have been clustered at the individual level14.  
A range of individual and school characteristics are controlled for due to their potential influence on 
pupil performance. Owing to the positive association with cognitive development problems for 
primary aged children, English as an additional language (EAL) status is controlled for (Sammons et 
al. 2007), alongside ethnicity, which plays a significant role in pupils’ educational trajectories 
(Dustmann et al. 2010; Wilson et al. 2011). Vignoles and Meschi (2010) identify that children from 
ethnic minority groups make greater progress than white children, while on average, females do better 
than males in terms of attainment. Alongside gender and ethnicity, gaps in educational attainment are 
commonly associated with socio-economic disadvantage (Strand 2014; Kramarz et al. 2008) which 
will be proxied in this model by free school meal eligibility (FSM)15. Similarly, Special educational 
needs (SEN) enters the model since SEN children characteristically perform worse than non-SEN 
children (Crawford and Vignoles, 2010; Kramarz et al. 2008). Younger children within the year group 
are consistently found to be academically disadvantaged, relative to children born at the beginning of 
the academic year (Campbell, 2013; Crawford et al. 2010); the month of birth is therefore controlled 
for. 
School characteristic controls include the local area deprivation of the school, measured by the Index 
of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) decile; this is also likely to represent or be highly correlated with the 
deprivation of the child’s and their classmates’ neighbourhood. The type of institution may also 
influence pupil performance at primary school (Silva, 2006), whilst the autonomy gains from 
conversion may differ by institution type. It is therefore important to control for differences in 
                                                          
14 If the individual’s school converts to become an academy, the treatment variable is often serially correlated as the 
individual is either deemed treated or untreated throughout the data. The error term is therefore correlated over time if 
any unobservable characteristics determine whether an individual is treated, thus standard errors are likely to be biased. 
Clustering standard errors at the individual level is one potential solution to this issue (Cameron and Miller, 2015).   
15 FSM indicates if the child was recorded as eligible for free school meals in a spring census in the last 6 years 
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institution type before conversion for all individuals and for control individuals in the post-treatment 
period16.  Finally, the number of months into the academic year that an academy converted is included 
in the model to control for any disruption effects alongside differences in exposure since conversion 
may occur in any month, thus differences in academy exposure may exist within models.  
3.2 Deprivation analysis 
 
Unlike Labour academies, post-2010 converter academies are not located exclusively in deprived 
neighbourhoods, though many converter academies do exist within deprived areas, thus allowing for 
a differential effect of converter academies by neighbourhood deprivation to be identified. This 
differential effect may be of policy interest due to the persistent gap between the performance of 
pupils from deprived and non-deprived areas in England, alongside the existing evidence on the 
negative impact of neighbourhood deprivation on pupil outcomes (Lindahl 2011; Nicoletti and Rabe, 
2010). This relationship, between deprivation and educational outcomes, could potentially be 
influenced by the academies programme. 
 
A difference-in-differences methodology continues to be implemented once the sample is restricted 
to individuals who attend schools in the top 30% of deprived neighbourhoods according to the Index 
of Multiple Deprivation. In a similar manner, the estimation is restricted to individuals in the 30% 
least deprived neighbourhoods. The effect of primary converter academies may then be compared 
between the most and least deprived neighbourhoods.  
 
3.3 FSM and ethnicity  
Gaps in educational attainment by ethnicity and FSM status, which is an indicator of socio-economic 
disadvantage, are equally apparent in the UK (Department for Education, 2015). In a similar manner, 
the sample is therefore split according to FSM status and ethnicity to identify whether a differential 
effect of converter academies is experienced due to these characteristics This allows for the 
identification of individuals who benefit to a greater extent from the academies programme.   
 
4 RESULTS  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
The descriptive statistics are presented for the treatment and control groups, who are observed in the 
pooled model, and for the non-academy group which includes individuals excluded from the main 
                                                          
16 Treated individuals will attend a converter academy in the post-treatment period.  
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analysis since their school did not convert within the sample period. Descriptive statistics from non-
academies are presented to provide justification for the use of eventual academies as the control group 
within the analysis. Table 5 provides the mean value of the control variables across the sub-samples. 
Relative to non-academies, eventual academies are more similar to the treated group in terms of 
individual characteristics such as EAL, ethnicity, FSM and SEN. School characteristics, such as IMD 
decile and the proportions of community, voluntary controlled and foundation schools17 are also more 
comparable for the treatment and control group. Due to large sample sizes, however, small differences 
in the mean values are significant. Eventual academies therefore bear the greatest similarities with 
the treated group thus prompting the use of these individuals as the control group.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Amongst the schools that did convert to academies, an almost equal distribution of deprivation, based 
upon the IMD deciles, is evident in Figure 4; it therefore does not seem that converter academies 
were mostly schools located in non-deprived neighbourhoods.  
[Figure 4 here] 
Table 6 provides the raw difference-in-differences estimates for each model; the difference indicates 
the change in the mean APS percentile between the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods, for both 
the treatment and control groups. The difference in the changes of the treatment and control group 
provides the raw difference-in-differences. All difference-in-differences estimates are positive, with 
the exception of model D which provides a negative raw difference-in-differences estimate, 
suggesting that the treated group progress between KS1 and KS2 to a lesser extent than the control 
group whose APS percentile improves more over the observed time period. Before treatment, when 
both groups were subject to the same untreated state, the treatment and control group in model A are 
the most dissimilar in terms of KS1 APS percentile with the pooled group providing the most similar 
treatment and control groups. Any group differences will be accounted for within the difference-in-
differences framework. 
[Table 6 here] 
Table 7 provides the raw differences in the APS scores of the three cohorts within the sample by 
treatment status. Since the APS percentile is calculated within the cohorts and is therefore only 
                                                          
17 Community schools refer to state-funded primaries that are controlled by the local council. Voluntary aided schools are 
state-funded primary schools that receive contributions from a foundation or trust (usually a religious organisation) which 
has a substantial influence on the school running. Voluntary controlled primaries have less autonomy than voluntary aided 
schools but are similarly influenced by a foundation or trust. 
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comparable within cohorts, the mean APS score is provided. Only the mean KS2 APS scores of the 
control group increase over time with cohort; interestingly, KS1 scores decrease with later cohorts 
among treated individuals, thus cohort 1 obtains the highest APS score on average both at KS1 and 
KS2. Individuals from the treatment and control group are most similar in cohort 3. The mean KS1 
and KS2 scores are marginally higher for treated individuals, relative to the control group, in every 
cohort.  
[Table 7 here] 
4.2 Main results 
 
A summary of the main results is provided in Table 8 with the full results provided in table A1 in the 
appendix. The results indicate a positive and significant effect of time; in model A, between KS1 and 
KS2 pupils move 3.7 percentiles up the cohort rank. This finding is consistent across all models. 
Since the rank is based on the APS scores of the entire cohort and includes all pupils whose school 
did not become an academy18, this movement of academy and eventual academy pupils up the rank, 
must be at the expense of the pupils of non-converters, who move down the cohort rankings. 
In model A, the coefficient on the treat variable is positive and significant at the 10% level, indicating 
that in the absence of treatment, the APS percentile rank of individuals in the treatment group is 
significantly greater than the rank of individuals within the control group. A similar effect is identified 
in models 12AB and the pooled model which are significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively. In 
model D, the treat coefficient is negative and significant indicating that treated individuals are ranked 
lower than their counterparts in the control group, in the absence of treatment. These differences are 
controlled for in the model. 
[Table 8 here] 
Model A identifies a positive and significant impact of primary converter academies upon pupil 
progress when analysing the impact of converter academies that converted in the 11/12 academic year 
by observing 11/12 primary leavers and adopting a control group of individuals who attended 12/13 
converters. Treated individuals are exposed to a converter academy for a maximum of one academic 
year since schools may convert at any point in the 11/12 academic year. The difference-in-difference 
estimate indicates that relative to pupils from the same cohort whose school converted to an academy 
in the 12/13 academic year, converter academies raised treated pupils’ percentile APS scores by 1.9 
                                                          
18 It excludes individuals who are dropped from the sample (e.g. infant and junior school attendees) as discussed in the 
data section   
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percentile points, ceteris paribus. This significant difference-in-difference estimate is greater than the 
raw difference presented in Table 7, once controls are added.  
The positive and significant effect of converter academies is consistently identified in all subsequent 
models, though the magnitude of this effect varies.  The effect identified in model B is slightly greater 
with a difference-in-difference estimate of 2.1. As in model A, model B analyses 11/12 converters 
when observing pupils from the 11/12 cohort, though in model B, 13/14 converters constitute the 
control group; the control group therefore leaves the school two academic years prior to conversion. 
A very similar result is identified in model 12AB where the control group of models A and B are 
simply pooled. With an adjustment to the control group, the difference-in-differences estimate 
remains positive and significant. 
A greater impact of primary converter academies is identified in model B, possibly because in model 
A, the treatment and control schools were more similar as they converted within one academic year 
of each other. Though the 12/13 converters could not benefit from the actual conversion in the 11/12 
academic year, they may have begun to put measures in place for conversion, providing benefits from 
some aspects of becoming an academy, for example by conversing with other converter academies to 
share expertise and pool resources (Department for Education, 2014b). Pupil performance may 
therefore be improved, closing the gap in performance with converter academies. This preparation 
may be less likely for 13/14 converters, who did not convert for some time after the 11/12 academic 
year, thus greater gaps in pupil performance may exist.  
Model C investigates whether the benefits of conversion increase with greater exposure to converter 
academies, as Eyles and Machin (2015) identify.  Model C continues to analyse the impact of 11/12 
converters but allows for an additional year of exposure by pupils from the 12/13 cohort. The 
difference-in-difference estimate indicates that treated individuals move 1.1 percentiles further up the 
APS percentile rank than pupils in the control group, ceteris paribus. Despite the greater level of 
exposure, the results from model C are actually smaller than those of models A and B, in which, only 
one year of exposure is observed. 
Model D presents the greatest estimated impact of primary converter academies, relative to alternative 
models; the percentile score of pupils who attend a converter academy is increased by 2.6 relative to 
the control group, ceteris paribus. Once controls are added, the effect estimated in model D is 
therefore in the opposite direction to the raw difference-in-difference estimate and is greater in 
magnitude. When compared with the previous models, this result suggests that the 12/13 converter 
academies had a greater influence on the progression of pupils between KS1 and KS2; this could 
arguably be due to the later converters having greater room for improvement. It is possible that some 
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of the fast-tracked ‘outstanding’ rated early converters may have narrowly missed the 10/11 academic 
year and may have instead converted in the 11/12 academic years. This is less likely to be so in the 
12/13 academic year since it is over a full academic year after the academy programme reform. 12/13 
converters may therefore be less likely to be ‘outstanding’ schools and more likely to be schools rated 
‘good’ by Ofsted.  It could therefore be argued that the gains to be made by conversion are simply 
smaller for schools that are already performing well; once treated, the 12/13 converter academies 
therefore provided pupils with greater levels of progression than in schools that were soon to become 
converter academies.  
The pooled model includes all individuals who completed primary school between the 11/12 and 
13/14 academic years, whose school eventually became a converter academy. The results indicate 
that converter academies raise pupils’ percentile APS by 1.4, relative to individuals who are not 
exposed to converter academies, ceteris paribus. Primary converter academies are therefore 
consistently found to have a positive and significant effect upon pupil progress between KS1 and 
KS2. Given the results of Table 8, it is unlikely that the difference in results between models is due 
to a differential average ability of the cohorts. 
 
The full table of results is presented within the appendix of this paper in Table A1. All estimates are 
consistent with the expected effects upon pupil progress, given the existing literature on the 
determinants of pupil outcomes. 
4.3 Deprivation Analysis 
 
The effect of primary converter academies is also estimated by the neighbourhood deprivation of the 
school attended, based on the IMD decile. The results, which are provided in the appendix in Table 
A2, indicate that individuals from the least deprived neighbourhoods more consistently benefit from 
converter academies, with the exception of models C and D which identify a positive but insignificant 
influence of converter academy attendance. Converter academies improve the APS percentile rank of 
pupils in schools in the least deprived neighbourhoods by between 1.2 and 3.7 percentiles, ceteris 
paribus. Unlike the main analysis, the greatest effect of converter academies is identified in model A. 
Amongst the most deprived neighbourhoods, there is a mostly insignificant effect of converter 
academies on pupil performance; model B, however, presents a highly significant result, which 
relative to the least deprived, is a rather large effect; ceteris paribus, converter academies significantly 
increase the APS percentile score of pupils by 11.8 percentile points. Though the results are not 
presented, it should be noted that the results are robust to a change in the neighbourhood deprivation 
measure to the Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI).  
18 
 
The results present an unclear picture of the effect of converter academies upon pupils when 
conditioning on the deprivation level of the school. Converter academies only have a positive 
influence on the treated from the deprived sample when the 11/12 converters are compared to the 
13/14 converters, within the 11/12 cohort. Even when comparing the same year academy converters 
but varying the cohort observed in model C, an insignificant result is identified.  Overall, the results 
suggest that although in one particular year and cohort, converter academies benefitted individuals 
attending schools within deprived areas to a greater extent, it is the pupils of converter academies in 
the least deprived areas that more consistently benefit from conversion. 
4.4 Ethnicity and FSM status 
In a similar manner to neighbourhood deprivation, the effect of primary converters is estimated by 
ethnicity and FSM status to identify whether academy conversion benefitted pupil progress 
differentially. FSM is a proxy for socio-economic disadvantage and provides a measure of pupil-level 
deprivation; this deprivation measure therefore varies from neighbourhood deprivation which is 
measured within the school’s neighbourhood and consequently reflects neighbourhood and peer 
disadvantage. Whilst these two measures may be correlated, the analysis by pupil and neighbourhood 
deprivation is not based on the same sample of individuals.  
The results which are provided in the appendix in Table A3 indicate that white children consistently 
benefit from primary converter academies, whilst non-white pupils are insignificantly impacted by 
converter academy attendance in all models. White children may therefore be driving the positive and 
significant results of the main analysis. Children eligible for FSM are identified as benefitting from 
primary academy attendance to a greater extent than non-FSM children; in model A, attending a 
converter academy leads to a movement up the cohort ranks by 5 percentiles for FSM pupils, relative 
to a 1.2 percentile improvement for non-FSM pupils. This conclusion is reached in four models as in 
models C and D, the effect of converter academies is insignificant for FSM pupils but consistently 
positive and significant for non-FSM pupils. Within the models in which a significant effect is 
identified, the progress of deprived pupils, as proxied by FSM status, is therefore improved to a 
greater extent.  
These findings are surprising given the existing, albeit limited, literature on the effectiveness of 
schools by ethnicity and disadvantage which suggests that there is an insignificant differential impact 
of school effectiveness by ethnicity or socio-economic status (Strand 2010; Strand 2014). Given this 
evidence, it may be expected that all pupil outcomes would be improved uniformly by academy 
attendance. However, McNally (2015) identifies that increases in school resources, as we expect 
academy schools to experience, are more effective in improving the performance of disadvantaged 
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pupils, thus potentially explaining the greater magnitude of the estimated effect on FSM pupils. 
Whilst there is little empirical evidence to suggest that the effectiveness of resources is also greater 
for white pupils, it could be argued that an increase in resources may close the gap between actual 
and potential performance which may be greater for white pupils. White pupils, on average, make 
worse progress than other ethnic minority groups (Vignoles and Meschi, 2010), experience lower 
parental involvement in schooling, are less likely to have high parental educational aspirations and 
are less likely to receive private tuition than pupils from other ethnic backgrounds19(Stokes et al. 
2015).  
4.5 Robustness check 
As a check of robustness, placebo estimations from the pre-treatment period are provided. The 
difference-in-differences model is estimated as in the main analysis, however, the robustness check 
will be performed based upon a falsified treatment effect using a sample of individuals who left school 
in the pre-treatment period20. The placebo test is a test of whether the impact of converter academies 
identified may be due to a pre-existing difference in trends between the treatment and control group, 
prior to treatment, that may be perceived as the treatment effect within the main analysis. If the results 
are robust, there should be an insignificant difference-in-differences estimate in the placebo model 
implying that there were no pre-existing differences in the trends of the treatment and control group 
prior to the actual year of treatment, while pupils could not be impacted by academy conversion, since 
leaving primary school before their school converted.  
The robustness check will be based upon model D from the main analysis since many of the control 
variables are unavailable prior to the 06/07 academic year thus the 06/07 -10/11 cohort is the earliest 
cohort that may be included in the placebo estimation21. Model D presents a suitable model for the 
placebo test since treatment occurs in 12/13, two academic years after the placebo treatment. This 
placebo test therefore avoids any overlap between the falsified treatment and the actual treatment. 
Treated individuals attend primary schools that converted to academies in the 12/13 academic year 
while individuals in the control group attend 13/14 converter academies. In the placebo model, all 
individuals complete KS2 in 10/1122 and therefore leave primary school before conversion; this 
contrasts with model D in which individuals complete KS2 in 12/13 (Table A4). Individuals within 
                                                          
19 From Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian and mixed heritage backgrounds 
20 The observed treatment period in this paper is 11/12 – 13/14; the pre-treatment period is therefore conversion in the 
academic years prior to 11/12 
21 The placebo test could be carried out in a similar manner to models A-C; however, the year of academy conversion 
within these models is the 11/12 academic year. It is therefore possible that the placebo results may be susceptible to 
Ashenfelter’s dip (Ashenfelter, 1978) which suggests that outcomes may fall directly before the treatment occurs. 
22 These individuals completed KS1 in 06/07 
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the treatment group in the placebo model therefore receive a falsified treatment. Results are provided 
in the appendix in Table A5. 
The results from the main analysis are robust, since when a falsified treatment is entered into the 
model in place of an actual treatment, the results fail to identify a significant difference in the 
outcomes of pupils who experience academies relative to pupils who do not experience a converter 
academy. The results therefore signify that there are no significant pre-existing differences in the 
trends of the treatment and control groups that could explain the difference in outcomes that was 
attributed to academy converters in the main analysis.  
5 Conclusions  
 
This paper examines the impact of converter academies upon pupil outcomes at the primary school 
level to identify how being exposed to a converter academy impacts upon pupils’ percentile rank 
within their cohort, according to their average point scores.  
 
Data from the National Pupil Database is utilised from 2008-2014 which covers three main cohorts 
of pupils who completed primary school in the summer of 2012, 2013 or 2014. A difference-in-
difference methodology is adopted in line with existing papers within the surrounding relevant 
literature (Eyles and Machin, 2015; Wilson, 2011; Böhlmark and Lindahl 2012), allowing for the 
evaluation problem to be overcome.  The treatment group comprises of individuals who attended 
primary schools that convert to academies while in attendance, whilst pupils who completed KS2 
before their primary school converted to become an academy form the control group. Relative to 
schools that never converted, eventual converters provide a more suitable control group since they 
are more characteristically similar to converter academies. The approach attempts to overcome the 
possible endogeneity issue by only observing individuals who had already enrolled in the primary 
school; the enrolment decision is therefore exogenous to the academy conversion. 
The main analysis involved the estimation of several models which varied by the cohort observed or 
academy conversion year of the treatment or the control group. The models predominantly examine 
the impact of converter academies that converted in the 11/12 academic year though the impact of 
12/13 converters is also examined and a pooled model analyses converters at any time between 2012 
and 2014.  
The results indicate a positive and significant impact of converter academies upon pupil progress; 
converter academies increase the percentile rank of pupils’ average point scores by between 1.1 and 
2.6 percentile points, ceteris paribus. A positive influence is consistently identified throughout the 
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analysis, regardless of the year of conversion and cohort observed in each model. This finding mirrors 
that of Eyles and Machin (2015) who analyse secondary Labour academies. The results also 
correspond with studies from the school autonomy literature which finds a positive relationship 
between school autonomy and pupil outcomes (Gibbons et al. 2008; Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011; 
Clark, 2009). These results are also found to be robust across specifications and to a placebo test 
which is performed based upon a falsified academy conversion treatment effect for individuals who 
completed primary school in 10/11 and therefore left prior to conversion. The placebo test found an 
insignificant impact of converter academies upon the APS percentile rank of pupils therefore 
signifying that there were no significant, pre-existing differences in the outcomes of the treatment 
and control group that could have been perceived as the effect of converter academies. 
The findings identify 12/13 converters as providing a greater positive impact than 11/12 converters. 
This could potentially be due to the sample of 12/13 converters containing fewer of the fast-tracked 
‘outstanding’ schools. This speculation does require future research, however, as this study is a pupil-
level analysis which finds little evidence that the outcomes of pupils were worse in later cohorts.  
The effect of primary converter academies is also estimated by neighbourhood deprivation to identify 
whether the pupils attending schools within the least deprived neighbourhoods benefit differentially 
to those in the most deprived areas.  The results more consistently identify a positive impact of 
converter academies within the least deprived neighbourhood sample; a large positive and significant 
effect is also identified within the most deprived neighbourhoods but this finding is inconsistent 
across models. Schools in deprived neighbourhoods therefore do not seem to benefit from academy 
conversion in all periods. The effect of primary converter academies is also estimated by FSM status 
and ethnicity to identify whether these individual characteristics may explain differentially effects of 
converter academy attendance. Non-FSM pupils and white pupils are found to consistently benefit 
from academy attendance in all models. Though inconsistent across specifications, the effect of 
converter academies is found to be greater for FSM pupils; an insignificant effect is identified for 
non-white pupils in every model.    
To my knowledge, this paper contains the first non-descriptive results from the investigation of the 
impact of post-2010 primary converter academies on pupil outcomes. The results overall suggest a 
positive role of the academies programme in improving the progress of primary school children. The 
change in policy made by the coalition government, allowing for all schools to become academies, 
therefore seems a positive transformation which has, at least in the case of the 11/12 and 12/13 
converter academies, begun to assist in improving the future outcomes of pupils, by advancing their 
progress between KS1 and KS2. 
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Future research should make use of additional years and cohorts of primary pupils; since at the time 
of analysis, the latest pupil outcomes available related to 2014, there was little scope to analyse the 
most recent converter academies. Due to the pronounced expansion of primary converter academies 
within England, it is imperative to identify the impact of this particular policy primarily since 
converter academies represent the greatest proportion of academy schools in England. However, 
sponsored academies continue to exist and continue to be opened thus the impact of these academies 
should also be examined.  
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Table 4 Sample size of each model of analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample sizes presented for the treatment and control group of each model to be estimated 
 
 
 
Figure 4 IMD decile of eventual academy converters 
 
  Higher values denote a lower level of deprivation 
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MODEL: CONTROL (0) TREATED (1) 
A 22,767 17,482 
B 19,307 17,482 
12AB 42,075 17,482 
C 19,688 17,417 
D 19,688 22,845 
Pooled 110,783 134,278 
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Table 5 Mean of control variables 
VARIABLE TREATED CONTROL NON-
ACADEMIES 
P-
VALUE 
(Treat & 
control) 
P-VALUE 
(Treat & 
non-acad.) 
EAL 0.123 0.107 0.162 0.000 0.000 
White 0.819 0.843 0.790 0.000 0.000 
FSM 0.244 0.236 0.272 0.000 0.000 
SEN 0.196 0.207 0.234 0.000 0.000 
Female 0.489 0.492 0.490 0.347 0.927 
Month of birth 6.531 6.561 6.548 0.031 0.087 
IMD decile 5.722 5.445 5.344 0.000 0.000 
Conv. month in acad. yr. 3.188 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Community school 0.325 0.562 0.625 0.000 0.000 
Voluntary aided school 0.106 0.294 0.228 0.000 0.000 
Voluntary controlled school 0.039 0.093 0.112 0.000 0.000 
Foundation school 0.11 0.06 0.023 0.000 0.000 
 
Sample means for treated, control and non-academies provided in initial three columns. P-values of the difference in 
means between treatment and control group and treatment and non-academies groups provided in the final two columns 
respectively. 
 
 
Table 6 Raw before, after and difference-in-difference estimates by model 
 BEFORE AFTER DIFFERENCE DID P-Value 
Model A control 47.62 51.29 3.67   
Model A treated 50.55 54.72 4.17 0.5 0.049 
Model B control 48.46 51.13 2.67   
Model B treated 50.55 54.72 4.17 1.5 0.000 
Model 12AB control 48 51.22 3.22   
Model 12AB treated 50.55 54.72 4.17 0.95 0.000 
Model C control 48.51 51.26 2.75   
Model C treated 51.11 55.15 4.04 1.29 0.000 
Model D control 48.51 51.26 2.75   
Model D treated 47.43 51.35 3.92 1.17 0.000 
Pooled model control 48.39 51.08 2.69   
Pooled model treated 48.97 52.47 3.5 0.81 0.000 
 
Sample means are provided before and after treatment alongside the difference between these means. DID gives the 
difference in the before-after difference. between the treatment and control group with the p-values given for the DID. 
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Table 7 Mean pupil KS1 and KS2 scores by cohort and treatment status 
COHORT  KS1APS KS2APS 
1 (11/12 leavers) Control 15.39 29.04 
 Treated 15.70 29.53 
 All cohort 15.49 28.18 
2 (12/13 leavers) Control 15.58 29.15 
 Treated 15.60 29.38 
 All cohort 15.59 29.30 
3 (13/14 leavers) Control 15.52 29.38 
 Treated 15.55 29.48 
 All cohort 15.54 29.46 
 
Mean Average Point Scores (APS) from Key stage 1 (KS1) at age 7 and Key Stage 2 (KS2) at age 11 for the treated, 
control groups and the full cohort of pupils including pupils attending non-academies.  
 
 
 
Table 8 Summary of main results from difference-in-difference analysis for all models 
 (1) 
MODEL 
A 
(2) 
MODEL 
B 
(3) 
MODEL 
12AB 
(4) 
MODEL 
C 
(5) 
MODEL 
D 
(6) 
POOLED 
MODEL 
DID 
(Time * treat) 
1.887*** 
(0.669) 
2.085*** 
(0.741) 
2.073*** 
(0.638) 
1.077* 
(0.563) 
2.604*** 
(0.812) 
1.431*** 
(0.251) 
Time 3.735*** 
(0.167) 
2.715*** 
(0.184) 
3.265*** 
(0.124) 
2.753*** 
(0.182) 
2.744*** 
(0.182) 
2.733*** 
(0.077) 
Treat 0.616* 
(0.329) 
 
0.419 
(0.348) 
0.583** 
(0.293) 
0.375 
(0.347) 
-1.023*** 
(0.314) 
0.894*** 
(0.145) 
N 40,249 36,789 59,557 37,105 42,533 245,061 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include: EAL, ethnicity, FSM, SEN, 
gender, school type, month of birth, school neighbourhood IMD decile, school open month. Pooled model also includes 
cohort controls.  
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Appendix 
Table A1 Full model results with all controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Model A Model B Model 
12AB 
Model C Model D Pooled 
model 
DID 1.887*** 2.085*** 2.073*** 1.077* 2.604*** 1.431*** 
 (0.669) (0.741) (0.638) (0.563) (0.812) (0.251) 
Time 3.735*** 2.715*** 3.265*** 2.753*** 2.744*** 2.733*** 
 (0.167) (0.184) (0.124) (0.182) (0.182) (0.077) 
Treat 0.616* 0.419 0.583** 0.375 -1.023*** 0.894*** 
 (0.329) (0.348) (0.293) (0.347) (0.314) (0.145) 
EAL -3.073*** -2.190*** -2.650*** -2.936*** -3.557*** -2.667*** 
 (0.746) (0.848) (0.632) (0.792) (0.705) (0.305) 
White -0.387 -1.561** -0.749 -2.713*** -2.089*** -1.581*** 
 (0.627) (0.708) (0.535) (0.671) (0.615) (0.258) 
FSM -8.726*** -8.742*** -8.664*** -8.127*** -8.660*** -8.513*** 
 (0.377) (0.402) (0.306) (0.395) (0.351) (0.152) 
SEN -32.649*** -32.256*** -32.305*** -32.779*** -31.902*** -31.996*** 
 (0.347) (0.367) (0.285) (0.378) (0.345) (0.145) 
Female 0.186 0.758** 0.505** 1.092*** 0.982*** 0.903*** 
 (0.302) (0.316) (0.248) (0.318) (0.297) (0.124) 
Community 0.679 0.089 0.611 0.611 1.185 0.020 
 (0.537) (0.638) (0.484) (0.453) (0.730) (0.214) 
Voluntary aided 2.689*** 1.688** 2.075*** 1.525*** 1.638** 2.208*** 
 (0.607) (0.699) (0.532) (0.535) (0.773) (0.240) 
Voluntary controlled 2.863*** 0.267 1.985*** 0.195 2.132** 0.481 
 (0.752) (0.848) (0.641) (0.724) (0.885) (0.303) 
MOB Feb -0.605 -0.865 -0.612 -1.321* -1.062 -1.235*** 
 (0.753) (0.786) (0.618) (0.787) (0.737) (0.311) 
MOB March -0.501 -2.321*** -1.409** -2.963*** -2.074*** -1.872*** 
 (0.727) (0.767) (0.604) (0.769) (0.725) (0.303) 
MOB April -2.507*** -2.393*** -2.663*** -3.144*** -3.095*** -2.896*** 
 (0.733) (0.773) (0.602) (0.778) (0.728) (0.304) 
MOB May -2.632*** -2.574*** -2.882*** -3.684*** -3.785*** -3.801*** 
 (0.727) (0.754) (0.592) (0.766) (0.710) (0.299) 
MOB June -4.192*** -4.407*** -4.058*** -5.524*** -4.847*** -4.919*** 
 (0.725) (0.769) (0.598) (0.770) (0.718) (0.301) 
MOB July -4.767*** -5.213*** -4.857*** -5.232*** -5.655*** -5.449*** 
 (0.737) (0.769) (0.605) (0.768) (0.720) (0.298) 
MOB August -5.539*** -5.846*** -5.710*** -7.239*** -8.079*** -6.681*** 
 (0.722) (0.750) (0.591) (0.755) (0.713) (0.297) 
MOB September 5.463*** 4.506*** 5.148*** 3.716*** 3.567*** 4.770*** 
 (0.723) (0.753) (0.595) (0.761) (0.716) (0.300) 
MOB October 3.552*** 3.260*** 3.326*** 3.176*** 2.744*** 3.181*** 
 (0.740) (0.775) (0.608) (0.767) (0.726) (0.302) 
MOB November 2.242*** 2.129*** 2.296*** 0.399 1.719** 2.304*** 
 (0.728) (0.774) (0.602) (0.772) (0.719) (0.307) 
MOB December 1.534** 1.551** 1.787*** 0.808 1.283* 1.432*** 
 (0.736) (0.776) (0.606) (0.792) (0.734) (0.307) 
IMD 2 1.595** -0.294 0.906 -2.209*** -0.391 1.402*** 
 (0.726) (0.746) (0.553) (0.729) (0.596) (0.271) 
IMD 3 -0.928 -0.679 -0.552 -0.600 0.579 1.377*** 
 (0.728) (0.746) (0.552) (0.748) (0.592) (0.278) 
IMD 4 0.888 1.769** 0.773 0.441 -1.687*** 0.607** 
 (0.737) (0.754) (0.569) (0.738) (0.632) (0.278) 
30 
 
IMD 5 0.963 -0.029 0.625 -0.709 0.801 1.950*** 
 (0.721) (0.821) (0.577) (0.810) (0.665) (0.289) 
IMD 6 2.532*** 3.822*** 2.829*** 1.221 1.607** 3.006*** 
 (0.749) (0.766) (0.580) (0.743) (0.664) (0.291) 
IMD 7 2.181*** 2.287*** 1.815*** 2.102*** 1.896*** 3.387*** 
 (0.772) (0.775) (0.594) (0.775) (0.671) (0.289) 
IMD 8 3.991*** 4.054*** 4.185*** 3.421*** 3.886*** 4.673*** 
 (0.788) (0.731) (0.577) (0.731) (0.644) (0.285) 
IMD 9 5.375*** 3.445*** 4.379*** 3.655*** 3.126*** 5.230*** 
 (0.741) (0.741) (0.574) (0.724) (0.677) (0.283) 
IMD 10 6.135*** 5.750*** 6.043*** 4.522*** 5.771*** 6.769*** 
 (0.715) (0.737) (0.557) (0.726) (0.641) (0.278) 
Conv. month in acad. yr. -0.040 -0.028 -0.032 0.094 -0.023 -0.027 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.059) (0.024) 
Cohort 2      -0.759*** 
      (0.157) 
Cohort 3      -1.907*** 
      (0.167) 
Constant 54.946*** 57.159*** 55.619*** 59.264*** 57.781*** 56.504*** 
 (1.110) (1.205) (0.919) (1.087) (1.147) (0.449) 
N 40,249 36,789 59,557 37,105 42,533 245,061 
Adjusted R2 0.320 0.312 0.315 0.301 0.300 0.299 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Base categories: Non-EAL, Non-white, non-FSM, non-SEN, male, institution type: foundation primary, January month 
of birth, most deprived neighbourhood decile, never converted (month into=0), 11/12 cohort (cohort 1). 
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Table A2 Summary of results from difference-in-difference analysis by school neighbourhood 
deprivation according to IMD. 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The time*treat coefficient is provided only 
Controls include: EAL, ethnicity, FSM, SEN, gender, school type, month of birth, school open month. Pooled model also 
includes cohort controls  
 
 
 
Table A3 Summary of results from difference-in-difference analysis by ethnicity and FSM 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The time*treat coefficient is provided only 
Controls include: EAL, SEN, gender, school type, month of birth, school open month in both models. FSM is controlled 
for within the ethnicity model only; ethnicity is controlled for within the FSM model. The pooled model also includes 
cohort controls  
 
 
 
 
 
TREAT: 30% LEAST 
DEPRIVED 
N 30% MOST 
DEPRIVED 
N 
A 3.747*** 
(1.306) 
13,658 1.454 
(1.700) 
10,703 
B 2.022* 
(1.051) 
14,067 11.844*** 
(2.954) 
9,583 
12AB 2.761*** 
(0.971) 
19,985 2.605 
(1.641) 
17,636 
C 0.546 
(0.923) 
14,108 1.424 
(1.418) 
9,782 
D 2.008 
(1.393) 
12,429 -2.136 
(1.515) 
15,079 
Pooled 1.163*** 
(0.437) 
79,843 -0.312 
(0.490) 
73,673 
 A B 12AB C D POOLED 
WHITE 2.344*** 
(0.722) 
1.924** 
(0.783) 
2.388*** 
(0.688) 
1.072* 
(0.605) 
2.206** 
(0.920) 
0.265*** 
(0.038) 
N 33,491 31,310 49,762 31,161 34,818 203,477 
 
NON-WHITE 0.511 
(1.779) 
2.869 
(2.285) 
0.279 
(1.712) 
0.159 
(1.519) 
0.637 
(1.742) 
0.004 
(0.084) 
N 6758 5479 9795 5944 7715 41,584 
 
FSM 4.980*** 
(1.594) 
4.935** 
(2.008) 
5.366*** 
(1.490) 
-0.539 
(1.221) 
0.988 
(1.633) 
0.187** 
(0.077) 
N 8792 8118 13,790 8486 11,410 58,669 
 
NON-FSM 1.245* 
(0.740) 
1.514* 
(0.805) 
1.322* 
(0.709) 
1.448** 
(0.634) 
3.034*** 
(0.932) 
0.293*** 
(0.039) 
N 31,457 28,671 45,767 28,619 31,123 186,392 
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Table A4 Placebo test sample summary 
MODEL BECAME ACADEMY YEAR LEFT 
PRIMARY 
 TREATMENT CONTROL  
D 12/13 13/14 12/13 
PLACEBO 12/13 13/14 10/11 
 
 
Table A5 Placebo test results summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include: EAL, ethnicity, FSM, 
SEN, gender, school type, month of birth, school neighbourhood IMD decile, school open month. Pooled model 
also includes cohort controls 
 
VARIABLES PLACEBO 
DID  (Time * treat) 0.366 
(0.140) 
Time 2.769*** 
(0.184) 
Treat 0.234 
(0.309) 
N 41,232 
